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INTRODUCTION 
Today you can have ubiquitous access to your data.  You can 
stream one digital copy of your favorite album to your stereo, televi-
sion, car, computer, and phone.  You can retrieve your latest memo 
from any of the same, or from any PC in the world with an Internet 
connection.  The advantages of such connectivity may seem appar-
ent,1 but what protection does the Constitution afford your informa-
tion?  Under current law, very little. 
The law must adapt to a world where the location of information, 
the means by which it travels, and the medium in which it resides 
have dwindling importance.  The Constitution protects privacy 
through the Fourth Amendment,2 and this Comment addresses such 
rights as they apply to data stored online on remote servers—what is 
known today as the “cloud.”3  The lines between traditional comput-
ing and cloud computing are blurring:  whether or not you store your 
data locally or remotely is increasingly irrelevant and indistinguish-
able, and this advancement exposes a flaw in the Fourth Amend-
ment’s “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” doctrine. 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Class of 2010.  B.A., English and 
History & Sociology of Science, University of Pennsylvania, 2006.  I would like to thank 
Professor David Rudovsky for his continued help with this topic. 
 1 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1975, 1980 (2006) 
(“Generativity denotes a technology’s overall capacity to produce unprompted change 
driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences. . . . [T]he Internet has developed 
in such a way that it is consummately generative.”).  But see Jeff Zeleny, Lose the Blackberry?  
Yes He Can, Maybe N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at A1 (noting President Obama’s depend-
ency on his Blackberry). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and 
no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 3 See, e.g., Steve Jobs, Chief Executive Officer, Apple Inc., Keynote Address at the World 
Wide Developers Conference 2008 (June 9, 2008) (explaining MobileMe, Apple’s imple-
mentation of “cloud computing,” in which a user stores all of his or her data on Apple’s 
servers, and has instant access via a Mac, PC, or iPhone). 
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Part I traces some unwieldy history of the Fourth Amendment.  
Under the Supreme Court’s search and seizure doctrine, police in-
trusion is not considered a “search” (requiring a warrant and prob-
able cause) if one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the observed property or communication.4  For example, officers 
can read the outside of a mailed envelope, but not its contents. 
Part II further explores this muddled case law.  Congress made a 
wide-ranging statutory attempt to set clearer privacy standards for 
new technologies through the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 (“ECPA”),5 specifically Title II, the Stored Communica-
tions Act (“SCA”).6  These laws determine the government’s ability to 
search data on remote servers.  Congress enacted them over two dec-
ades ago, but the question of whether email has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy remains unresolved.  Has one “knowingly exposed” 
her information to the public by storing her email on remote servers, 
thereby eliminating an objective expectation of privacy?  Analogies 
from court decisions regarding bank and phone records would sug-
gest yes,7 which would mean that government intrusions of email do 
not require a warrant.  A recent Sixth Circuit opinion addressed the 
issue but was vacated on other grounds.8 
I would like to see such data protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
and to add to the discussion I analyze a new technological develop-
ment—the blurring of online and offline applications—that raises a 
similar but distinct legal question than that raised by email.9  Part III 
of this Comment explains that development, and describes new kinds 
of technologies offered by Google, the Mozilla Foundation, and oth-
ers.  Part IV then shows how casual computer users might not be able 
 
 4 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the government violated the 
Fourth Amendment when it eavesdropped without a warrant on a telephone booth con-
versation). 
 5 Pub. L. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 6 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
 7 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor has 
no expectation of privacy in bank records because he “takes the risk, in revealing his af-
fairs to another [e.g. the bank], that the information will be conveyed by that person to 
the Government”). 
 8 See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that email is pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment), vacated in part, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 9 I would like to acknowledge a similar law review note:  Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA:  
Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043 (2008).  Be-
cause both pieces focus on Fourth Amendment protections of electronically stored in-
formation, there is necessarily overlap in background information.  However, Mr. Oza’s 
Note focuses specifically on email, whereas my Comment expands the issue to include 
additional kinds of remote data. 
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to distinguish these new programs from traditional programs.  This 
could result in a reasonable belief that the users’ data is on their 
computers, when it is in fact stored remotely.  Such a belief indicates 
a need for Fourth Amendment protection of this data. 
Finally, Part V suggests solutions.  Having argued that online data 
should be protected, I offer three routes that courts could take to so 
hold.  The first follows the current doctrine and attempts to distin-
guish online data from analogous cases of phone and bank records 
(neither of which are protected).10  The second suggests an overhaul 
of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” doc-
trine.  The third and most radical approach suggests an overhaul of 
the entire Fourth Amendment doctrine, shifting the focus from pri-
vacy to security. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  “Searches” Under the Fourth Amendment 
In a case involving a potential breach of the Fourth Amendment, 
we first ask whether a search or seizure has taken place.11  If not, we 
can ignore whether the action was performed reasonably or was sup-
ported by a warrant.  Whether it is a search depends on the “reason-
able expectation of privacy” standard. 
Justice Harlan sowed this rule in his concurrence in Katz v. United 
States.12  The case asked whether the Fourth Amendment protected 
phone booth conversations; FBI agents had placed an electronic 
“bug” on the outside of a public booth in order to record the defen-
dant therein.13  The majority declined to frame the issue in terms of a 
constitutionally protected space, noting that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”14  It also declined to frame a general 
“right to privacy.”15  Instead, the majority found a Fourth Amendment 
violation, but did so without articulating a general rule, noting only 
 
 10 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (finding no privacy protections for records 
of phone numbers dialed); Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (finding no privacy protections for 
bank records including checks and deposit slips). 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 12 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 13 Id. at 348. 
 14 Id. at 351. 
 15 Id. at 350–51. 
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that “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will 
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”16 
But having a definite rule is critical because a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy not only determines whether a “search” has taken 
place, but often also determines whether a defendant has standing to 
challenge an intrusion under the Fourth Amendment.17  And if a de-
fendant was not “searched” or does not have standing, he cannot ac-
cess the most powerful weapon against Fourth Amendment viola-
tions:  the exclusionary rule.18 
B.  The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Rule 
Harlan’s Katz concurrence articulated a test later adopted by the 
Court to establish a search:  “[T]here is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”19 
The Supreme Court eventually adopted this as the rule, but not 
after some uncertainty.  For example, in Oliver v. United States, the 
Court held that a police trespass did not constitute a search, despite 
the fact that the defendant had posted “No Trespassing” signs sur-
rounding a highly secluded and remote area.20  Surely the defendant 
had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in such an area, so 
the Court must have thought that an expectation of privacy in “open 
fields” is unreasonable to the populace.21  Over the years, the Court 
addressed the privacy question repeatedly, and mostly chipped away 
at Fourth Amendment protection in a variety of contexts.22  Often, 
 
 16 Id. at 359. 
 17 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that the exclusionary rule only excludes 
evidence discovered by a search or seizure that violated the rights of the defendant who 
invokes it). 
 18 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (declaring that “the Fourth Amendment’s 
right of privacy [is] enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth [Amendment]”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded from use at 
trial). 
 19 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 20 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984). 
 21 See William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1, 36 (2001) (explaining that “each condition [is] necessary for establishing a valid privacy 
claim”). 
 22 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (aerial observation of curtilage not a 
search); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (no protection for garbage 
properly put out on the curb); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (aerial sur-
veillance generally not a search); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 (open fields not protected, de-
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technological developments provided these new contexts, like the 
privacy interest in the heat emitted from one’s home, which police 
can observe with infrared imaging.23 
Harlan’s language returned in two major opinions.  The fractured 
decision in Florida v. Riley24 furthered the doctrine but exemplified 
the confusion.  There, a police helicopter flew over a greenhouse and 
spotted, through two broken roof panels, marijuana growing inside.25  
The plurality emphasized that the police flew at a legal altitude, and 
that therefore “[a]ny member of the public could legally have been 
flying over Riley’s property [at that altitude] and could have observed 
Riley’s greenhouse.”26  But Justice Blackmun’s dissent noted a com-
mon thread woven through a majority of the Court: 
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens, and Justice 
O’Connor, I believe that [whether there was a “search”] depends upon 
whether Riley has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” that no such sur-
veillance would occur, and does not depend upon the fact that the heli-
copter was flying at a lawful altitude . . . . A majority of this Court thus 
agrees to at least this much.27 
The Court reiterated and solidified the rule in Bond v. United 
States.28  Citing Riley, it stated:  “First, we ask whether the individual, by 
his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of pri-
vacy . . . . Second, we inquire whether the individual’s expectation of 
privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”29 
 
spite “No Trespassing” signs); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in one’s car movements); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 710 (1983) (canine “sniff test” not a search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 
(1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone records); United States v. White, 
401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (recordings of conversations with informants not a search); 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (no protection for conversations with in-
formants); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (informant’s recording of a 
conversation not a search); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (infor-
mant’s secret radio transmission of a conversation not a search).  But see Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (police use of a device that is not in general public use, to 
explore details of the home that would be unknowable without physical intrusion, is a 
search); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (manipulation of the exterior of 
luggage is a search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (automobile tracking 
becomes a search once an officer continues to monitor the electronic device after defen-
dant has entered his residence). 
 23 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that use of such technology was a search). 
 24 488 U.S. 445.  The opinion had a four-person plurality, a concurrence, and two dissents. 
 25 Id. at 448. 
 26 Id. at 451. 
 27 Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 28 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (holding that a search had occurred when an officer squeezed the 
defendant’s luggage to find contraband). 
 29 Id. at 337–38 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). 
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C.  Whether One Has “Knowingly Exposed” Information to the Public 
At the same time, the Court began a secondary line of reasoning 
that often determined the reasonable expectation of privacy issue.  It 
rested on language, arguably dicta, from Katz:  “What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”30  This makes sense.  For 
example, if one were to leave contraband in plain view of the street, 
even if it were behind glass and inside the home, a sighting of such 
would not be a search.31 
In United States v. White,32 the Court expanded the meaning of 
knowing exposure.  There a hidden agent, with his informant’s con-
sent, overheard a conversation between the informant and defen-
dant.33  The agent radioed the speech to another agent outside.34  The 
Court, drawing on precedent of cases involving informants,35 held 
that “[i]f the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted 
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect 
him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversa-
tions.”36  The Court stretched “knowing exposure” even further in 
California v. Greenwood.37  There, investigators asked the neighbor-
hood’s regular trash collector to pick up the defendant’s trash at the 
curb.  The trash collector then assisted by separating the defendant’s 
trash for systematic search.38  The Court held that the defendants 
“exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim 
to Fourth Amendment protection.”39 
“Knowing exposure” means not only that which a person exposes 
to friends (potential informants) or to the public (like trash on the 
curb).  It also includes that which one systematically exposes to an in-
stitution.  Two such cases are especially relevant to this Comment be-
cause of the analogies that one can draw between them and the insti-
tutions of cloud computing. 
 
 30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 31 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing 
how, because the contraband in question in that case was viewable “from a public area 
outside the curtilage of the residence,” such a sighting did not violate the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights). 
 32 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 33 Id. at 746–47. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 36 White, 401 U.S. at 752. 
 37 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 38 Id. at 37–38. 
 39 Id. at 40. 
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In United States v. Miller,40 the Court considered bank records.  The 
defendant used a bank which later assisted in his prosecution.41  The 
Court held that a bank depositor has no expectation of privacy in 
bank records, reasoning that he “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another [i.e. the bank], that the information will be con-
veyed . . . to the Government.”42  And in Smith v. Maryland, police re-
corded the phone numbers dialed by a suspect.43  The Court doubted 
“that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in 
the numbers they dial.  All telephone users realize that they must 
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company.”44  But does it 
follow that they realize the exposure to warrantless searches? 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CASE LAW, A RESPONSE BY CONGRESS, AND THE 
DOCTRINE TODAY 
A.  Searches Involving Current Technology 
Applying these rules to situations outside the physical world can 
be difficult.  We now live in a world populated as much by bytes as it 
is by people.  For example, what does it mean for data to be know-
ingly exposed when it is stored on a computer?  Does it matter if it is 
displayed on the monitor, or if it can be accessed with just a few 
mouse clicks?  What if the data is encrypted, or requires a password to 
access?  Taking the idea of knowing exposure as literally as possible, 
what if the computer or the hard drive is deposited as trash on the 
curb? 
Such questions highlight the complexity of searches in this area.  
In his comprehensive article, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 
Orin Kerr tackles these issues.45  He suggests that we can make some 
analogies to searches in the physical world, like taking the Fourth 
Amendment’s heightened protection of the home and applying it to 
the computer.46  Since an Internet-connected personal computer is 
 
 40 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 41 Id. at 437–38. 
 42 Id. at 443. 
 43 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 44 Id. at 742. 
 45 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005). 
 46 Id. at 538. 
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the portal to one’s home in the digital world, we can take the notion 
of “home as castle” and extend it towards “hard drive as castle.”47 
But there are problems with leaving it up to the courts to move 
this doctrine into the digital world.  We have seen the Fourth 
Amendment’s piecemeal growth, and the whimsical definition of 
“reasonableness.”  For example, Justice Souter’s dissent in Illinois v. 
Caballes48 pointed out a flaw in the majority’s reasoning:  “The [hold-
ing] rests . . . [on a premise] that experience has shown to be unten-
able, the assumption that trained sniffing dogs do not err. . . . The in-
fallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.”49  Such per se 
rules, like those concerning open fields,50 can dismiss Fourth 
Amendment protection even when a defendant had what many 
would consider a perfectly reasonable expectation of privacy. 
And technology can only make things more confusing.  For ex-
ample, in Kyllo v. United States,51 the Court dealt with a novel style of 
investigation.  Police used a thermal imager to examine the amount 
of heat emanating from a suspect’s home.52  The Court held that 
where the government uses a device that is “not in general public 
use,” the surveillance is presumptively a search.53  This raises the ques-
tion:  which technologies are “in general public use”?  Today one can 
affordably purchase infrared equipment at many sporting goods 
stores. 
While privacy advocates may see Kyllo as a ray of hope, it high-
lights how abruptly the case law can change course.  Other problems 
with case law include the need to educate the judiciary regarding 
nascent technologies, and the need for a case or controversy before 
the doctrine can be furthered through judicial opinions. 
B.  A Solution by Congress:  the Electronic Stored Communications Act 
In 1986 Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act54 to comprehensively confront privacy in the digital age.  Section 
2703 of the ECPA, part of the Stored Communications Act,55 allows a 
 
 47 The recent developments of offline/online applications require an expansion of this pro-
tection to include not only local hard drives, but also remote storage mediums, as dis-
cussed infra Part III. 
 48 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that a dog sniffing for drugs was not a search). 
 49 Id. at 410–11 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 50 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 51 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 52 Id. at 29–30. 
 53 Id. at 34. 
 54 Pub. L. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 55 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
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court to order an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to turn over 
emails and other electronic records, without notifying the suspect, if 
they have resided on an external server for more than 180 days.56  It 
has yet to be challenged under the Fourth Amendment in the Su-
preme Court. 
C.  Warshak v. United States 
Whether email has a reasonable expectation of privacy is still un-
resolved.  The most recent major case on point is Warshak v. United 
States,57 last argued before the Sixth Circuit in mid-2008.  It chal-
lenged section 2703(d) as violating the Fourth Amendment.58 
The initial Circuit panel held that “individuals maintain a reason-
able expectation of privacy in e-mails that are stored with, or sent or 
received through, a commercial ISP.”59  One of the factors that the 
panel weighed was the type of agreement that a given user had with 
his or her ISP.60  The court upheld a preliminary injunction of the 
government from “seizing . . . the contents of any personal e-mail ac-
count” unless the government provides prior notice to the e-mail user 
or shows that the user has no reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-
vis the ISP.61  In effect, the court held that section 2703(d) was un-
constitutional.62 
However, the panel was soon reversed en banc.63  There the Cir-
cuit avoided the ECPA issue by reversing on other grounds.64  Thus, 
protection for email remains uncertain. 
III.  THE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF “BLURRING” 
Technology can conflate the contexts of our lives.  For example, it 
is becoming increasingly difficult to separate work information from 
personal information, as people take their laptops and Blackberries 
 
 56 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). 
 57 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (vacating in part 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 58 490 F.3d at 460–61. 
 59 Id. at 473. 
 60 Id. at 475. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. (“[S]ubpoenaing the entity with mere custody over the documents is insufficient to 
trump the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.”). 
 63 Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 64 See id. at 525 (holding that the claim was not yet ripe for adjudication). 
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home with them.65  Even more radically, personal identity can be-
come blurred, as people spend more time online, often using aliases 
and alternate personas.66  But two types of blurring are especially re-
levant to the application of the Fourth Amendment and section 
2703(d) to digitized data:  the blurring of online and offline applica-
tions, and the blurring of what we consider to be communications. 
A.  The Blurring of Online and Offline Applications 
Most computer users know that offline applications—traditional 
programs like Microsoft Word, Adobe Photoshop, etc.—reside on 
their hard drives, along with all the applications’ associated data.  On-
line applications—webmail, Google Documents, Yahoo Calendar, 
etc.—store their information in the “cloud”:  the entire application 
and its associated data reside on remote servers owned by providers 
like Microsoft and Google.  The idea behind the cloud is that users 
seem to save and access  their information to and from the ether:  no 
matter where they are, they can conjure up what they need.  Users do 
not need to know or see the physical medium in which their data is 
stored; the content becomes entirely independent of the hardware.  
Cloud computing is greatly building up steam, with Apple launching 
its MobileMe service,67 Google enabling offline access to potentially 
any kind of online application,68 and the largest distribution of Linux 
advancing a new cloud computing initiative.69 
 
 65 See William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace:  To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest, 
12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 49 (2008) (examining legal issues pertaining to the use of 
Internet and email use at work). 
 66 See, e.g., Paul Ham, Warrantless Search and Seizure of E-Mail and Methods of Panoptical Prophy-
laxis, 2008 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. & J. 090801 (discussing the differences between 
the perception of privacy and the actual privacy of e-mail communication). 
 67 See Steve Jobs, CEO, Apple, Keynote Address at the World Wide Developers Conference 
2008 (June 9, 2008).  Here Jobs announced Apple’s MobileMe service.  It automatically 
synchronizes contacts, calendars, emails, and photos between a user’s computer, iPhone, 
and the Internet.  All of the user’s data is stored on remote servers, and is accessible 
through several types of user-friendly portals. 
 68 In May 2007, Google introduced an open platform called Google Gears.  See Aaron 
Boodman and Erik Arvidsson, Gears API Blog: Going Offline with Google Gears, GEARS API 
BLOG, May 30, 2007, http://gearsblog.blogspot.com/2007/05/posted-by-aaron-
boodman-and-erik.html.  Developers of online applications can employ this platform to 
enable users to access their information regardless of whether their computer has an In-
ternet connection.  Gears does this by copying information from the cloud and storing a 
copy on the user’s hard drive.  If the Internet connection fails, applications can seamlessly 
switch into “offline mode” and the user can continue to edit her data with little variation 
in usage. 
 69 See Posting of Mark Shuttleworth, mark@ubuntu.com, to ubuntu-devel-
announce@lists.ubuntu.com, https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel-announce
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The issue I would like to address is the merging of these two types 
of technology.  In September 2008, Google introduced its new web 
browser, Chrome,70 which gained very favorable reviews from the out-
set.71  With Chrome, a user can “create” a desktop version of any on-
line application.  In his review of Chrome, David Pogue of The New 
York Times described that process as follows: 
When you click [the “Create application shortcuts” command], the cor-
responding site opens without the usual address bar and buttons—in 
other words, it now works exactly like a regular desktop program.  For 
services like Gmail or blogging software, this feature further blurs the 
line between online and offline software.72 
He concluded his review by noting that, with Chrome, Google is 
building a platform for running software, which may “de-
emphasiz[e]” traditional operating systems.73  This would conse-
quently downplay the traditional PC in favor of the cloud.  In fact, 
Google has recently announced a forthcoming, entirely cloud-based 
operating system based on Chrome.74 
In many ways, online applications have already become almost in-
distinguishable from their offline counterparts.  Chrome and similar 
projects such as Mozilla Prism75 seek to completely integrate online 
applications with the desktop.  Some online applications, like Micro-
soft’s online version of Outlook, look just like their desktop counter-
parts, pixel for pixel.  But while people using email must realize that 
their message travels over the Internet and through an ISP’s servers, 
it is likely that many people using an online calendar or online doc-
uments do not realize that their information is on a remote server ra-
ther than on their computer. 
 
/2008-September/000481.html (Sept. 8, 2008) (“Another goal is the the [sic] blurring of 
web services and desktop applications.”).  However, the idea of cloud computing has 
been around for a while.  See, e.g., John Markoff, An Internet Critic Who Is Not Shy About Ruf-
fling the Big Names in High Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at C6 (“For Microsoft, the 
idea behind Net is software programs that do not reside on any one computer but instead 
exist in the ‘cloud’ of computers that make up the Internet.”). 
 70 Press Release, Google, Google Chrome:  A New Take on the Browser (Sept. 2, 2008), 
available at http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20080902_chrome.html. 
 71 See, e.g., Walter S. Mossberg, Google Redefines Web Browser, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2008, at D1 
(“Chrome is a smart, innovative browser, but this first version is rough around the 
edges.”). 
 72 David Pogue, Serious Potential in Google’s Browser, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at C1. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Google, Introducing the Google Chrome OS, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG, July 7, 2009, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/introducing-google-chrome-os.html. 
 75 Prism, introduced in October 2007, is an add-on for Mozilla’s free, open-source browser, 
Firefox, which acts very much like Chrome’s desktop application feature. See Mozilla 
Labs, Introducing Prism (Oct. 24, 2007), http://labs.mozilla.com/2007/10/prism/. 
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The central issue is, therefore, whether a user has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in content that she sensibly believes is on her 
computer’s hard drive, when it in fact may be located on a remote 
server.  That belief will become increasingly reasonable as developers 
continue to make online and offline applications indistinguishable.  
And such is the trend across cloud providers who wish to thereby 
make the cloud experience more familiar and enjoyable.76 
B.  The Blurring of “Communications” 
Over the past decade, the Internet has undergone another major 
shift: towards “Web 2.0,” an increasingly interactive, information-
sharing Internet.  Web projects like Wikipedia depend on the col-
laboration of millions of different users to generate content.77  Sites 
like Flickr make it easy for users to share photos and pool their work 
using tags.78  And social networking sites like Facebook allow people 
to edit their friends’ pages.79  Sharing information, with dozens or 
millions of people, is becoming second nature on the Internet. 
With such applications, it can be tricky to define what exactly a 
“communication” is in “Web 2.0.”  If I publicly post a graphic to 
Flickr and someone else tags it as a “goat,” have we, together, com-
municated the idea of a goat to others?  If I share my online calendar 
with others, and add a personal event to it, have I communicated with 
them, even if the event is posted for my sole benefit?  If my calendar 
automatically emails me a reminder of an upcoming event, is that 
technically a communication? None of these examples is as cut-and-
dry as ordinary email.  Email is clearly a communication; its purpose 
is to send a message to someone else.  With these other examples, 
communication with others may be incidental, collateral, or an after-
thought.  The ECPA should more precisely define “communications” 
to reflect these issues. 
 
 76 See Stephen Baker, Google and the Wisdom of the Clouds; A Lofty New Strategy Aims to Put In-
credible Computing Power in the Hands of Many, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 24, 2007, at 48 (noting 
Google’s goals “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible”). 
 77 See Wikipedia, Five Pillars, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Five_pillars (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2009) (“Wikipedia is free content that anyone may edit . . . .”). 
 78 See Flickr:  Tour, http://www.flickr.com/tour/share/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (“With 
millions of users, and hundreds of millions of photos and videos, Flickr is an amazing 
photographic community, with sharing at its heart.”). 
 79 See Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/facebook?v=info&viewas=0 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (“Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to share and 
make the world more open and connected.  Millions of people use Facebook everyday to 
keep up with friends, upload an unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and 
learn more about the people they meet.”). 
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IV.  WHY THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD PROTECT INFORMATION IN 
ONLINE APPLICATIONS 
A.  Two Hypotheticals and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Imagine that a young, tech-savvy teenager wants to set up a new 
computer for his decidedly analog uncle.  He knows that computers 
are heading the way of the cloud, and that online applications are of-
ten free.  Accordingly, he buys a computer with Google’s forthcom-
ing operating system, populating the entire desktop exclusively with 
online applications.  The computer is always connected to the Inter-
net.80  His uncle then begins using the computer, taking full advan-
tage of the applications for his calendar, documents, spreadsheets, 
email, and so on.  It is quite possible—even reasonable—for him to 
mistakenly assume that all of the data is on his hard drive, safely with-
in the confines of his home and under the full protection of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Now imagine another teenager and her aunt.  This teen is aware 
of cloud computing, but cares more about her aunt’s privacy, and so 
she opts to set up a traditional desktop system.  All of her aunt’s ap-
plications and data reside on her hard drive, and her aunt, correctly, 
believes that her data is stored in her house.  The aunt has the full 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.  The uncle, under the ECPA, 
does not. 
These two hypothetical situations show how the law can treat iden-
tical front-ends disparately.  The uncle would have a reasonable, 
though mistaken, belief that he has not “knowingly exposed” his data 
to the public.81  These divergent expectations illustrate complications 
inherent in applying the law to emerging technologies. 
 
80  This is ever more feasible and common.  Not only are broadband modems connected 
continuously, but laptops are increasingly coming bundled with wireless cards with cellu-
lar capabilities and plans from providers like Verizon and AT&T.  See, e.g., Veri-
zon Wireless—Mobile Broadband—Overview—What Is Mobile Broadband?, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/mobilebroadband/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) 
(“Mobile Broadband service from Verizon Wireless lets you browse the Internet, down-
load files and access email from your notebook.”).  Such a computer could remain online 
anywhere with cellular reception.  Id. (“Our growing high-speed network covers more 
than 90% of the U.S. population—more than 280 million people in 259 major metropoli-
tan areas and 250 primary airports in the U.S.—so you can stay connected even when 
you’re on the go.”). 
 81 Arguably the defendant in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), also had a reason-
able belief that his fields, secluded and surrounded by “No Trespassing” signs, were pri-
vate.  See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Policy Reasons for More Privacy in This Area 
There is already a mountain of scholarship arguing the merits of 
differing degrees of privacy in our society.82  The focus of various ar-
guments ranges from fears that the police will abuse high-tech sur-
veillance,83 to concerns over our society’s heightened need to monitor 
terrorism.84  However, I will raise a brief point particular to cloud 
computing:  failing to acknowledge an expectation of privacy in off-
line applications can disadvantage people less familiar with com-
puters, which includes the elderly and less affluent populations.85 
What is “reasonable” must include the perspectives of these 
groups.  While they are a minority of the online population, they are 
rapidly expanding their share.86  The current economic climate is 
forcing the price of personal computers to plummet.87  Additionally, 
consumers are now flocking to “netbooks”:  cheap computers that are 
designed primarily for web surfing.88  These developments will cause a 
growing number of inexperienced PC users to work extensively with 
online applications.  They are less likely to understand how and 
where their data is stored, and their reasonable expectation that their 
data is private should be protected. 
 
 82 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 519–
22 (2007) (discussing a policy model of Fourth Amendment law); Seth F. Kreimer, Sun-
light, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters:  The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional 
Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991) (describing the debate over the pros and cons of disclo-
sure and openness); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 115 (2008) 
(arguing that the “privatization” of the Fourth Amendment “fails to do justice to its 
text”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 539–49 (2006) (dis-
cussing blackmail, appropriation, and other problems associated with increased accessi-
bility). 
 83 See generally Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance:  Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 
56 ALA. L. REV. 9 (2004). 
 84 See Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers:  Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom 
in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 133–38 (2004) (describing efforts in the 
“war on terrorism” to increase information sharing across government agencies). 
 85 See Ann Bartow, Open Access, Law, Knowledge, Copyrights, Dominance and Subordination, 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 869, 870 (2006) (noting that wealthy people have more frequent 
and faster access to the Internet than poorer people); Eric L. Carlson, Note, Phishing For 
Elderly Victims:  As the Elderly Migrate to the Internet Fraudulent Schemes Targeting Them Follow, 
14 ELDER L.J. 423, 426–33 (2006) (noting that the elderly population’s adoption of com-
puters makes them more of a target for fraud). 
 86 See Carlson, supra note 85, at 425–26 (noting that “[o]lder Americans are going online in 
record numbers”). 
 87 See Bruce Einhorn, Acer’s Game-Changing PC Offensive, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 20, 2009, at 65 
(discussing how the manufacturer Acer uses cutthroat pricing to gain market share). 
 88 Brad Stone & Ashlee Vance, $200 Laptops Break a Business Model, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, 
at B1 (raising the point that today’s current economic climate is creating a tipping point 
where people will begin flocking to netbooks and free online applications). 
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V.  THREE MODELS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF ONLINE 
APPLICATIONS 
Having surveyed the doctrine and argued that we should protect 
our online and offline data from warrantless searches, I now turn to 
three ways in which the law can defend that right.  The first is 
through use of the current doctrine; despite Smith v. Maryland 89 and 
United States v. Miller,90 an argument can be made that an expectation 
of privacy in online data, given its blurring with offline data, is rea-
sonable.  The second is to overhaul the reasonable expectation of 
privacy doctrine, clarifying it as not one but several standards, with 
Smith and Miller falling under a different standard than the standard 
under which cloud computing cases could fall.  Finally, some have 
argued that the Fourth Amendment as a whole should be overhauled.  
Online data could be protected under an entirely new doctrine. 
A.  Protection Under the Current Doctrine 
Under the current framework, courts could protect cloud data by 
distinguishing it from bank and phone records.  Miller and Smith do 
not necessarily control the issue at hand, because storing one’s data 
on a remote server is not “doing business” in the way that one inter-
acts with a bank, nor is an IP address analogous to a telephone num-
ber, since the former is less understood in the populace. 
However, a split from past doctrine might be more beneficial.  
The ECPA highlights a fundamental flaw with the doctrine, especially 
because it has gone unchallenged for so long.  A drastic overhaul of 
either the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, or of the 
Fourth Amendment as a whole, could greatly clarify and heighten 
protections for communications. 
B.  An Overhaul of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine 
As many commentators have noted, privacy “is a concept in disar-
ray.”91  Not only is the idea spread across several bodies of law,92 the 
Court has interpreted the concept in unpredictable ways.  The “rea-
sonable expectation” doctrine itself is prone to a serious problem of 
circularity.  The judiciary can declare an expectation “reasonable,” 
and then that expectation trickles down to the general population 
 
 89 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 90 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 91 Solove, supra note 82, at 477. 
 92 Id. at 483 (noting privacy interests in tort, property, and evidence law). 
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where it eventually becomes reasonable, regardless of whether it ac-
tually was reasonable to begin with.93  The unpredictability and arbi-
trariness of the doctrine is equally distressing.94 
However, clarity can be achieved and seemingly inconsistent re-
sults can be harmonized if we attempt to break down the Supreme 
Court’s rulings into distinct categories with different standards of 
“reasonableness.”  Professor Kerr has attempted to do so by breaking 
down the approaches of the Court into four models of Fourth 
Amendment Protection:  the probabilistic model (considering the li-
kelihood that information will become known to others or the po-
lice), the private facts model (asking whether the government’s con-
duct reveals particularly private or personal information), the positive 
law model (considering whether a government search interferes with 
property rights or other legal standards), and the policy model 
(which asks whether a particular type of police conduct should be re-
gulated).95 
These models provide flexibility for the Court to distinguish be-
tween invasions that are “reasonable per se” and invasions that are 
“reasonable only if the government has a countervailing interest such 
as probable cause.”96  The advantage of making this distinction using 
four different models is that the Court, when confronted with a novel 
case, can pick whichever model provides the best proxy for determin-
ing whether a particular police activity is troublesome.97 
Smith and Miller were decided under the probabilistic model:  
“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that 
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Govern-
ment.”98 
However, as exposure of information becomes less “knowing,” as 
it does as online and offline content increasingly blur, the probabilis-
tic model provides a less exact proxy.  In such cases, the Court can re-
sort to the private facts model, which it has done when considering 
new technologies.99  Under such a model, courts would likely find 
 
 93 See Rubenfeld, supra note 82, at 106–07 (explaining the circularity problem in detail). 
 94 See discussion supra Part II. 
 95 Kerr, supra note 82, at 506. 
 96 Id. at 525. 
 97 Id. at 543. 
 98 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 751–52 (1971)); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“[P]etitioner as-
sumed the risk that the [phone] company would reveal to police the numbers he di-
aled.”). 
 99 See Kerr, supra note 82, at 544 (“[T]he private facts model works independently of the 
technology and thus permits a stable rule that remains constant as technology changes.  
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that email, and other data stored in the cloud, will likely contain facts 
of the most private kind.  They could therefore find a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in online applications without disturbing Smith or 
Miller. 
C.  An Overhaul of the Entire Fourth Amendment 
As just demonstrated, maintaining the current regime of privacy 
requires considerable intellectual gymnastics.  One might instead ask 
whether the Fourth Amendment should focus on privacy at all, given 
that neither it, nor any other part of the Constitution, mentions the 
word “privacy.”100  Academics have called for an overhaul of the 
Fourth Amendment that focuses on other concepts that are more ex-
plicit in the text, such as liberty and security.101 
Professor Rubenfeld argues that the Fourth Amendment explicitly 
states that security should be the focus of the doctrine.102  He notes 
the problems of circularity,103 the flaws in a legal concept of privacy 
based on widely shared social expectations,104 and the untenability of 
the Stranger Principle.105 and develops a test to replace the reason-
able expectation of privacy test.  His test of “generalizability” asks 
whether a given state practice, such as wiretapping, would become 
oppressive if enacted extensively and in a manner similar to the ab-
horrent general warrant of colonial times.106 
 
Given that, it should be unsurprising that the Supreme Court gravitated towards the pri-
vate facts model in cases that involve technological surveillance.”); see also, e.g., Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (dealing with a novel style of investigation, use of a 
thermal imager to examine the amount of heat emanating from a suspect’s home, and 
holding that where the government uses a device that is “not in general public use,” the 
surveillance is presumptively a search). 
100 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
101 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 82, at 104 (urging a shift to a focus on security). 
102 Rubenfeld, supra note 82, at 104 (“The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right of 
privacy.  It guarantees—if its actual words mean anything—a right of security.”).  The 
Fourth Amendment states:  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects . . . shall not be violated.” (emphasis added). 
103 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
104 See Rubenfeld, supra note 82, at 107–09 (noting that the “social expectations” of privacy in 
a given situation will always depend on specific facts about the situation and the people 
involved). 
105 Id. at 131 (arguing that “the Stranger Principle is completely untenable.  It implies that, 
once an individual has exposed information to a third party, the government may seize 
that information—with or without that third party’s assistance”). 
106 See id. (“A single arrest on suspicion may have a negligible or nonexistent effect on popu-
lar security.  But a general warrant is different.  It is, precisely, a warrant authorizing the 
police to arrest or invade homes generally on mere suspicion.”). 
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The facts of Katz are clearly an invasion under this test, since a sys-
tematically and pervasively wiretapped populace would certainly feel 
less secure from, and more oppressed by, the State.  A search of on-
line material is similarly impermissible under this test, since a system-
atic search of the general population’s online information would be 
equally oppressive. 
Of course, the interest sought to be protected in both Smith and 
Miller could also potentially be impermissible under the generalizabil-
ity test:  would public discourse and feelings of security be crushed by 
systematic searches of bank records and phone numbers?  One could 
argue either way, but there is no doubt that current case law would be 
greatly unsettled by the adoption of the generalizability test at the 
expense of the privacy doctrine. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A discussion of such a radical overhaul should give us pause—a 
chance to ask what the Fourth Amendment currently protects, and 
what it should protect.  We have come a long way from the enactment 
of the Bill of Rights, when government agents were only concerned 
with “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”107  While emails have been 
around for a while, this blurring of online and offline applications is 
relatively new, and computing will continue in this direction for the 
foreseeable future.  The complete integration of web applications in-
to the desktop, through the likes of Google Chrome and Mozilla 
Prism, is a young phenomenon.108 
Eventually, the Court will address the question of the protection 
of email.  I urge that the blurred and nascent landscape of online ap-
plications be included in the discussion.  That phenomenon will grow 
to include an ever greater range of information, and the protections 




107 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
108 Chrome is just a year old.  See Google, A Fresh Take on the Browser, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE 
BLOG, Sept. 1, 2008, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/fresh-take-on-browser. 
html (announcing Chrome’s launch).  Prism is in beta and is still not yet widely imple-
mented.  See Mozilla Labs, Introducing Prism (Oct. 24, 2007), http://labs.mozilla.com/ 
2007/10/prism/ (outlining the goals of the Prism beta releases). 
